Ni Liangkang
Ⅰ
In the process of the knowledge transmission from the west to the east,
which lasts for over a century, the influence of German philosophy on the eastern thought
can be called not only "extensive", bur also "deep". The examples for
these two sides are available everywhere: from Kant, Hegel, Marx to Nietzsche, Freud,
Husserl, Heidegger etc, their thoughts have always had either apparent or hidden effects
on the different levels of the eastern cultures.
Of course, most of these complicated influences and effects are
concretely represented with distinct concepts, views, slogans, ideals and problems. The
concept of "intellectual intuition" (intellektuelle Anschauung ) in German
philosophy is a quite typical example. Its effect in the theoretical deep layer exhibits
the extraordinary sight of cultural exchange.
From a historical view, the concept "intellectual intuition"
once became a magical password in German philosophy. It was a common idea that
"intellectual intuition" in the effective range of pure reason is put up as
contradiction in adjecto with Kant. But now it is certain that in the scope of practical
reason Kant tried with it to solve the problem of the "highest point" of
philosophy or "the highest principle in the whole sphere of human knowledge"
[Kant: Critique of pure reason, B 135]. After that, Fichte made an attempt to demonstrate
his philosophical starting point, i.e., "I", in virtue of "intellectual
intuition".
While in the philosophy of Schelling, "intellectual
intuition" is called even "the organ of all the transcendental thoughts"
["Organ alles transzendentalen Denkens", in: Schelling: System des
transzendenten Idealismus, S. 59 (vgl. Schelling- W Bd. 2, S. 43)]. "Intellectual
intuition" and "transcendental philosophy" are here combined together
organically.
But with the further development of the classical German philosophy, or
we can say, with the decline of transccndental philosophy after Schelling, the function of
"intellectual intuition" is held back quite soon. It is firstly oppugned and
refused by Hegel, who looks upon "intellectual intuition" as a too simple
matter: "Because it is the easiest manner to put the knowledge on what occurs to
someone" (Denn es ist die bequemste Manier, die Erkenntnis darauf zu setzen, - auf
das, was einem einfaellt.) [Hegel: Vorlesungen ueber die Geschichte der Philosophie, S.
2280 (vgl. Hegel-W Bd. 20, S. 428)], that is the same as the night, "where all cows
are black" (worin alle Kuehe Schwarz sind), or as "the naivety of emptiness on
knowledge" (die Naivitaet der leere an Erkenntnis). [Hegel: Phaenomenologie des
Geistes, S. 18 (vgl. Hegel-W Bd. 3, S. 22)]. With Schopenhauer, the contemporary and
opponent of Hegel's, it is regarded as "correct names" of "humbug and
charlatanism (Windbeutelei und Scharlatanerei)". [Schopenhauer: Die Welt als Wille
und Vorstellung, S. 21 (vgl. Schopenhauer- ZA Bd. 1, S. 17)] It is the one of few
harmonies between Hegel and Schopenhauer. After this, Lucacs in Hegel-Marx's camp sees the
"intellectual intuition" in Schelling's philosophy as "absurd mystery"
and brands it as "the first form of representation of irrationalism" or even as
"the irrationalism of pre-fascism".
In sharp contrast to this, "intellectual intuition" exerts
deep-seated influence in eastern thought. The most important two thinkers in eastern
cultural circle, Nishida Kitaro in Japan and Mu Zong-san in China, each has accepted this
concept in their philosophy and understood it in their own way. Nishida comprehends the
"intellectual intuition" as "a deep grasp of life". And Mu Zong-san
sees the foundation of Chinese philsosphy in the concept of "intellectual
intuition" and points out, "Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism all affirm that
'intellectual intuition' exists." He goes so far as to believe that this concept is
"an important idea which forms the difference between the Chinese culture and the
western culture". Finally, Heidegger, who wins some inspirations in his research on
eastern thought, presents a standpoint far from the western and quite near to the eastern
philosophy in this question. He apprehends "intellectual intuition" as a seizing
of the Urphaenomen which such persons as Goethe and Husserl have mentioned, or as a
seizing of "the structure of entity [Seiendes]", "of absolute entity."
The two attitudes towards the problem of "intellectual
intuition" clearly show a well considerable cultural phenomenon. In other words, the
different fates, which "intellectual intuition" has experienced in the eastern
and western cultures, represent de facto their different characters to a great extent.
Considering the time, I would here just follow and define some
fundamental meanings of the concept "intellectual intuition" in Kant's
philosophy and the understanding and accepting of this concept in Mu Zong-san's thought. I
pay attention to the question: how is a problematic concept in classic German philosophy
built into the kernel category in the thought of one of the most important thinkers, if
not the most important one, in the 20th century in China. In the end, I would like to give
some impetus to solve the problem of "intellectual intuition" from the aspect of
phenomenology.
Ⅱ
Whether Kant is the first to put up the concept of "intellectual
intuition" remains a matter of indifference. It is important that even if his concept
is not raised first by Kant, it becomes the kernel question of philosophy with him for the
first time.
Kant's own expositions on "intellectual intuition" are
scattered and inconsistent but there are still three elementary contents found in them,
which can finally be reduced to Kant's comprehension of the expression
"intellectual."
First of all, the "intellectual" of Kant's refers to
"understanding" (Verstand), which means the "faculty of connection of given
intuitions in a experience" (Vermoegen der Verknuepfung gegebener Anschauungen in
einer Erfahrung). He says, "intellectual refers to cognitions acquired through the
understanding, and they can also reach our sense world" (intellektuell sind
Erkenntnisse durch den Verstand, und dergleichen auch auf unsere Sinnenwelt). [Kant,
Prolegomena §34] In opposition to "intellectual" in
this sense stands the concept "intelligible". "Intelligible refers to
objects, which can be represented only through the understanding and is inaccessible to
any of our sensual intuitions" (Intelligible heissen Gegenstaende, so fern sie bloss
durch den Verstand vorgestellt werden koennen und auf die keine unserer sinlichen
Anschauung gehen kann.) [Kant, Prolegomena § 35] Kant calls
"intelligible objects" as "noumenon" or "thing-in-itself"
too. We can say, "intellcetual" functions as principle of liaison of phenomenon
within experience, and "intelligible" signifies the noumenon, which goes beyond
experience and cannot be reached through intuitions. In this contrary usage to
"intelligible", the concept of "intellectual" has a positive meaning
in Kant.
Of course, the "intellectual" understood this way has nothing
to do with "intuition", because as soon as "intellectus" tries to
provide intuitions beyond experience, i.e., "nonsensual intuition" or
"intellectual intuition", the object of "intellectual intuition" is
then non-intuitive "Noumenon" or "lntelligibelia". So in a strict
sense, "intellectual intuition" is "intelligible intuition". And this
is a contradictio in adjecto in itself, similar to "wooden iron" in Husserl. In
the "prolegomena", Kant calls "intellectual intuition"
"senseless" as well as "useless" [Prolegomena, §
34]. And in "Critique of pure reason", he regards it as something "that is
not what we possess, and of which we even cannot have a "clear insight into the
possibility [Critique of pure reason, B307].
This is the first element which "intellectual intuition"
contains in Kant. "Intellectual intuition" in this sense is what Kant rejects.
From then on the understanding of Kant's concept of "intellectual intuition" is
based on these exposition of Kant, namely comprehending "intellectual" as
"understanding" (liaison of phenomenon within experience) or better as
"intelligible" (the noumenon beyond experience). For example, Heidegger points
out in his discussion about "intellectual intuition", "For Kant, nothing
else exists outside sensual intuition, only the objects given through senses are
knowledgeable."
By Kant however, the concept of "intellectual intuition"
contains a second element. This element stands even before the first element in the
context of "Critique of pure reason". Kant identifies the "intellectual
intuition", which is relative to the second element, with "intuition of self
activity". This definition appears hard to understand at first. But if we link this
with Kant's understanding of the concept "intelligence", which is related to
"intellectual", the matter will become clear. "Intelligence" means
here "I" or "soul". In "Critipue of pure reason", Kant has
explicated it in different ways, for example: "I exists as an intelligence" [B
158] OR "I as intelligence of thinking subject" [B 155] or "soul" is
"the idea of intelligence" [B710] etc. He illustrates further that we can call
ourselves "intelligence" because we are conscious that our thinking activity is
spontaneous: "it is owing tothis spontaneity that I entitle myself an
intelligence" [B158]. In other words, the existence of "I" is defined
through the activity of "I think".
So the second meaning of "intellectual" deals with the
spontaneity of thinking or the self-activity of subject. In a short word, it involves the
fundamental principle of the subjectivity-philosophy since Descartes, that is, the
"self-onsciousness" as "highest point" of philosophy. Kant attaches so
much importance to the "self-consciousness" in this sense as to saying, "to
that highest point… we must ascribe all employment of the
understanding, even the whole of logic, and conformably therewith, transcendental
philosophy. Indeed this faculty of apperceptions is the understanding itself." [B
135]
The "intellectual intuition" with regard to the
"intelligence" in this sense is at first the intuition of the subject on itself.
If the "intellectual intuition" in the first sense means "intuition in the
way of understanding", the "intellectual intuition" in the second sense
should first of all refer to "the intuition of intelligence of itself".
The concept "intellectual intuition" in the second sense has
obviously had an impact on such post- Kantian philosophere as Fichte and Schelling. They
apprehend "the essence of intelligence" as "observation of itself",
and "the immediate self-consciousness" as "back-movement of
intelligence" of "intellectual intuition". The concept of
"intellectual intuition" in Mu and Nashida contains the meaning in the same
aspect, either titled as "intuition of life" of titled as "intuition of
will", as "intuition of conscience" etc.
However, Kant himself does not go so far effectively. In his further
consideration of the "I" as "intelligence", he makes distinctions
between the consciousness on self-activity and the thinking of I. Strictly speaking, the
former belongs to intuition and the latter belongs to thinking. In other words, the
self-activity (thinking) is given to us in the way of the "sensual intuition",
but the "I" is just conceived in the way of "the intellectual
thinking" without appearing. In this way, the "self-activity" as phenomenon
and the "I" as Noumenon separate themselves from each other. The activity of
"thinking" gets into consciousness, but the I-subject is not recognized. In this
sense, Kant says, "the consciousness of itself is thus very far from a knowledge
of the self." [B 158]
Following this explanation, the intuition of the self-activity of
thinking could be an intuition in a strict sense and an experience of appearances. And the
intuition of the subjective "I" behind the self-activity is contradictio in
adjecto too, and it is therefore an "intelligible intuition", a thinking of the
non-appearing noumenon. We could understand now why Kant defines the character of
"subject" as "intelligible". It means, just as the object-world in
itself does not appear in the sense of sensual objects and it is thus metaphysical, the
subject-I in itself does not in the sense of sensual objects (self-activity of thinking)
either and it is therefore metapsychical. So Kant says, "the concept of the 'I' in
the psychological principle 'I think', i.e., the concept of the "self" in all
the representations of which I am conscious, "tells us nothing" [A 401], because
in a strict sense, "the consciousness of myself in the representation 'I' is not an
intuition", "this I has not the least predicate of intuition". In other
words, that the representation of "I" or self-consciousness offers is not the
intellectual concept about objects.
But the subject as 'subject of thinking' or "intelligence"
has in Kant's opinion still the character of "empirical", that is to say, the
say the self-activity of thinking, of which we are aware and intuitive. It is seen as
belonging to subject: thinking is my thinking.
According to this, the self-consciousness in sense of self-thinking and
self-cognition through intuition of the self are entirely different in Kant: the former is
the appearing existence of the "I", and the latter the objective existence of
the "I". We could say too that self-consciousness sees correlative acts just as
"mine", and self-cognition deals with the question "what is the 'I'".
The latter question, i.e., the question of knowledge about noumenon, is
according to Kant not to be resolved through human understanding. But he does exclude the
possibility of a solution to this question. We just cannot have insight into the
possibility. As Windelband says, "the possibility of this faculty is so little to
deny as its reality to affirm." (Die m?glichkeit eines solchen Verm?gens ist so wenig
zu verneiner, wie seine Verwirklichkeit zu bejahen). [Lehrbuch der Geschichte der
Philosophie, S. 470]
Kant ascribes this possibility to God at last. It is the third element
which "intellectual intuition" has in him: "original intuition". Kant
calls it somewhere else "intellectus archetypus" or "divine
understanding" too, "which not only presents to itself the objects which are not
given, but through this representation the objects should themselves be given or
produced". [B 732, B145] The so-called "intuitus originarius" means
"the intuition which can itself give us the existence of its object" [B72]. The
opposite from this is intuitus derivativus. Kant means that, either inner intuition or
outer intuition is in a strict sense not "intuition of understanding" or
"intelligible intuition", but "sensual intuition", therefore
"intuitus derivativus". Whereas, the "intellectual intuition"
"only belongs to the primordial being (Urwesen)", and it is "intuitus
originarius" [B 72]. "Original" has here the meaning of "original
constitution," We can signify this intuition as "creative intuition" too,
because it is on one hand not a passive receptive intuition but an intuition, through
which the existence of given objects is determined in the same process of intuition. On
the other side, it is not an active spontaneous intuition, because it is not, like the
thinking of neumenon, Just a presupposition and tells us nothing outside our experience,
but it produces its correlates. This is also the main understanding of Mu Zong-san about
the concept "intellectual intuition" in Kant: "it is not a faculty of
cognition but that of
creation", "a faculty of production".
More attention here that Kant sometimes explains "intellectual
intuition" in this sense of "intuitus originarius" as
"imagination", or more strictly as "productive imagination", which
finds itself between sensuality and intellectuality. The basic definition of imagination
runs as follows: "imagination is the faculty of representing in intuition an object
that is not itself present" [B 151], so Kant brings it (at least in edition A of
"Critique of pure reason") into the category of "intellectual
intuition", and it means "one of the fundamental faculties of the human
soul"[A 124], which connects the intellectual concept with the sensual intuition.
Of course, the problem here is in which sense imagination is intuition?
If, as Kant says, it is through imagination that the intellectual concept can be connected
with the sensual intuition, the imagination itself should not be an "intuition"
in a genuine sense, but something between intellectuality and sensuality. It is neither a
blind "thinking of intellectuality" nor an empty intuiting of sensuality. It is
rather a "spiritual seeing" and a producing through it, in other words, it is a
creative seeing of a seeing production, like what Merleaur-Ponty calls "the third
eye" and the corresponding "spiritual image". Here the "intellectual
intuition" is still "creative" and "original", but not a
"godly" activity any more, but a "human" activity.
Though Kant himself and Fichte subsequent to him are occupied enough
with the concept of imagination, we cannot say that their explanation concerned are as
clear as possible. But it provides the followers with space for interpretation. In
Schelling then, "intellectual intuition" in this sense it not any more different
form "artistic intuition". The connection between "intellectual
intuition" and "artistic intuition", which is nearly lost in Kant, is
recovered in Schelling again. It is due to the consequence of the influence of Schelling
that Nashida later comprehends "intellectual intuition" as "the intuition
which is possessed by artists, religionists and so on." Let's take a sum-up now. The
analysis here shows that the concept of Kant's "intellectual intuition" has at
least three fundamental meanings at least:
1. In the dimension of the external intuition as "intelligible
intuition" of some non-objectified "transcendental object", for example the
intuition of the "world" or of "the thing in itself".
"Intellectual" means here "the orientation to" or "the
relationship with" "the objective noumenon" above all. "Intellectual
intuition" is simply to be interpreted as "metaphysical intuition."
2. In the dimension of the internal intuition as "intelligible
intuition" of some non-objectified "transcendental object", for example the
intuition of "I" or of "freedom of the will". "Intellectual"
means here "the orientation to" or "the relationship with the subjective
noumenon". "Intellectual intuition" is simply to be interpreted as
"psychical intuition".
3. The creative intuition or imagination in the sense of the
"intuitus originarius". "Intellectual intuition" here is understood as
"faculty of creation". But in principle just God has it. In case of human being,
it amounts to "imagination". "Intellectual intuition" is simply to be
interpreted as "creative intuition". In these different meanings, the first two
are limitative concepts, i.e., negative ones. Only the third is positive. Since then the
subsequent adoption and development of the concept "intellectual intuition" in
the west and the east is essentially based on these three original significations.
Ⅲ
Up to now the great effect, which the problem of "intellectual
intuition" has caused in the thought history of the world, is embodied without doubt
in the thought-system of Mu Zong-san. The two books, which Mu has finished in his later
period, namely "Intellectual Intution and Chinese Philosophy" as well as
"Appearance and Thing in itself", gove overall expositions about Kant's
philosophical system, in particular deep- seated analysis about the problem of
"intellectual intuition". He has noticed the important meaning of all of Kant's
insights, and pointed out, "the major crux thereby is whether intellectual intuition
exists or not".
Mu Zong-san believes that the concept of "intellectual
intuition" is "an important idea which forms the difference between Chinese
culture and western culture". He tries outgoing form here to accept, understand and
transform "intellectual intuition" in Kant. And he hopes, "we can win new
motivations through the encounter of the classical Chinese philosophy and Kant's
philosophy, and we can see the signification and value of the tradition of Chinese
philosophy and its mission of epoch and its renascence, and we can see lacks of Kant's
philosophy too". The first basis for the realization of this hope should lie on the
understanding and evolvement of the Kant's concept "intellectual intuition".
Today we are justified to say that "intellectual intuition"
is a fundamental starting-point for Mu Zong-san's interpretations of Chinese classical
thoughts with the help of Kant. Precisely thanks to this, it provides us with a
fundamental starting-point for our grasping of Mu Zong-san's thought-system.
The corresponding review of Mu Zong-san in "Intellectual Intuition
and Chinese Philosophy" is mainly based on the second and third meaning, which Kant
endowed to "intellectual intuition". From the second meaning (i.e., the
"meta-psychical intuition"), Kant's definition is negative. Therefore, Mu
Zong-san also identifies the non-self-appearing subjective "I" or soul with
"thing-in -itself" and the conscious activities of subject with
"appearance" of "psychic appearance". In his opinion, it is a dual
opposition that comes out here: on one hand, it is "the view of psychic
appearance". It means that this is "a thought, which exists by thinking and
ceases to exist by the cease of thinking". And on the other hand, it is "the
view of thing in itself". It means something, which is "a movement without
moving and a thought without thinking". How could both "the psychic
appearance" and "the mind in itself" communicate with each other? - This
question is unsolvable according to Kant. So Mu Zong-san points out, "all
difficulties lie on the question, how can a subject intuit itself inwardly".
For the solution to this difficulty, Mu Zong-san expects a speccial art
of cognition, namely the "intellectual intuition" rejected by Kant. He gives
this concept positive meanings and he thinks that it can interpret the excellence of the
whole Chinese philosophy: "If the humanity has really not the intellectual intuition,
the whole Chinese philosophy must break down completely and the painstaking effort of many
thousand years must go to waste, just as vain hopes." And on the side of the western
philosophy, it is devoid of the tradition of "intellectual intuition" in the
positive sense, so "it [intellectual intuition] cannot be seen as possible even
through Kant's wisdom."
This way of "intellectual intuition" is either called
"apperception", "godly manifestation" with the concepts of Leibniz-
Kant of "heaven cognises (presents) the beginning or all things" (Yi -Zhuan),
"knowing without knowledge" etc. with the concepts of Chinese philosophy. It is
evident that the contents, which Mu Zong- san understands in the tile of
"intellectual intuition", are numerous and complicated and that they contain
nearly all the methodological characters of Chinese philosophy. Thus besides the above-
mentioned formulations, he also calls "intellectual intuition" as "the
will-less viewing", "the solitary awareness", "the complete
consciousness" and sometimes as "thorough knowledge", "evident
cognition" etc.
If these contents summarized and arranged, some different elements are
roughly acquired in the concept of "intellectual intuition" understood by Mu
Zong-san. Even if he himself does not distinguish this definitely, we can see in his own
explications at any rate the following three essence- factors, which relate themselves
each other but cannot be reduced any more at last:
1) "Original intuition" or "primitive intuition"
(relative to the "sensual intuition" as "secondary intuition"). Mu
Zong-san finds out that the "intellectual intuition" in this sense is also
"the cognizing (presenting)" in the so-called "heaven cognises (presents)
the beginning of all things" in "Yi Zhuan", it is "the intuition of
the beginning of all things". In this interpretation of the concept
"intellectual intuition", Mu Zong-san has made use of Wang Yang-ming's concept
of "conscience", i.e., the "conscience as basis of all things on haven and
earth", In other words, "the cognizing of heaven" is seen as
"conscience", and the "beginning" means "the basis of all things
on haven and earth".
The "intellectual intuition" in this sense is also the grasp
of Kant's "foundation of the metaphysic of moral". "This grasp is both
"heavenly" and "godly", i.e., "heavenly and godly". The
"Heaven" in the Chinese philosophy and the "God" in the western
philosophy accord themselves with each other. They designate a transcendent ground. Mu
Zong-san defines it with each other. They designate a transcendent ground. Mu Zong-san
defines it with the "nature" in Mengzi's "good" or Kant's
"freedom" and "autonomy". What is acquired through "intellectual
intuition" in this senses "heavenly fate", "heavenly nature",
"heavenly mind", "heavenly human", or in Kant's words, "godly
fate", "godly nature", "godly mind", "godly human", -
The basic characters of the corresponding "intellectual intuition" can be
epitomized as primitive, original, or as god-produced, natural respectively.
2) "Vertical intuition" (relative to the "sensual
intuition" as "horizontal intuition"). Mu Zong-san identifies this meaning
of "intellectual intuition" with the former one, or at least he explicates it in
combination with the former. For example he says, "If we have a definite
understanding about the fundamental ideas of Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism, and if we
know where the ultimate problem is, we shall know that these three systems direct itself
at the ultimate and last stratum." "We generally call them vertical
systems." And in the same place he says further, "All that directs itself at
this final and last stratum belongs to vertical systems." But in this
"vertical" is evidently contained a meaning different from "original".
In "Appearance and Thing in Itself", Mu Song-san speaks about "through
haven and earth, through past and present". In "Lectures on the Theory of the
Four Causes" afterwards, he says, "this 'knowledge' is such a knowledge in the
sense of vertical", but "the knowledge in the sense of cognition is a horizontal
one and has the opposition of subject and object."
This "vertical" means firstly "creative" and
"genetic". Therefore Mu Zong-san says that "intellectual intuition" is
"a principle of creation and not a principle of cognition". He finds the theory
of Confuciansim as the most representative for vertical systems: "It starts by human,
and opens the ideas of 'nature and substance'". Then "vertical" contains
also the meanings of "development", "linking-up", that is to say, the
so-called "the echo of being", "the continuum of the wise life". The
"vertical" in this sense mainly means the circulation and linking-up of
"the source of our life, of our wisdom and our creation of moral". Not having
set a high value on Hegel's thought -system. Mu Zong-san is in agreement with Hegel on the
respect of the historical, genetic consciousness. - The characters of the according
"intellectual intuition" can be
epitomised as historical, genetic, lively, or we can say temporal,
being.
3) "Essential intuition" or "genuine
intuition"(relative to the "sensual intuition" as "objective
intuition"). Mu Zong-san explains "intellectual intuition" in this sense
mostly with the help of Heidegger's "Eject", i.e., "being-in -itself
produced inwardly." But this manner is not suitable and is not consistent with
Heidegger's basic position. Maybe it is more appropriate to explain with the aid of
Husserl's "essential intuition", because it is with this method that Husserl
grasps the essential moments and structure of the pure consciousness. Mu Zong-son says
too, "Through the function of 'apperception' we are conscious of a constant and
invariable 'ego', i.e. the soul-mind-substance itself, or called as genuine subject,
genuine ego." "If we want to have an intuition on this genuine ego as such, this
intuition must be intellectual, and not sensual." It is to notice another point, at
which Mu Zong-san is in keeping with Husserl: Mu Zong-san thinks that the "genuine
ego" discussed here is not the individual ego, but the "absolute ego" or
"pure ego" called by Husserl. He says, "'Mind' mainly means the absolute
universal mind, which exists through all ages one and only".
Mu Zong- san signifies the "being-in-itself of mind" as
"so-being". It does not appear, it is not "appearance of mind", but
the "Bhutatathata" (Soheit in German) in the Buddhist sense. We can say too that
it is not the "essence" (Sosein), but the "existence" (Dasein). If
"intellectual intuition" has an object, this object is a kind of
"intuition- less being", or of "cognition-less being". Mu Zong-san
points out, "the ontological character of the understanding is not to be given
up". But this "being" must not be an intuitive being. Therefore the
so-called "intellectual intuition" is namely "objectless intuition",
"because the duty of the intuition is to realize the being of something as what it
is, but not to justify the understanding of the winding appearance of something that
already exists. The latter is a matter of the understanding and sensibility". - The
characters of the according "intellectual intuition" can be epitomized as
essential, so-being, appearance-less while appearance-ful.
Of course, in a general view, the correlates of all three kinds of
"intellectual intuition" represent the same; consequently he does not
distinguish these correlates furthermore and sees them at most ad the three characters of
the same thing. Is is evident that the way he does is based on his Confucian position. He
says, "In China, Confucianism substitutes the Tao-substance for God, and the
mind-substance is in one with the Tao-substance, so just one is left in the end. If you
call it God, it is God; if you cal it freedom, it is freedom; if you cal it immortal soul,
it is immortal soul."
Therefore, to summarize the functions of the concept "intellectual
intuition" in Mu Zong-san's philosophical thoughts, we can say that this concept
really offers Mu Zong-san a full new aspect of a new fundamental starting-point as
mentioned before for the inspection of Chinese Philosophy and even of the whole eastern
and western philosophy. It makes him possible to surpass the other thinkers who are not
familiar with the western philosophy in the extensity of the horizon and the strictness of
the analysis.
Finally it is to make mention of two basic goals, to which Mu
Zong-san's explications on the "intellectual intuition" have aimed: he tries to
reinterpret the basic characters of Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism in Chinese culture
with it on one hand, and the other hand he wants to make up for the shortage of Kant's
philosophy and even of the whole western philosophy with it. The intention of the latter
is a little farfetched, because in the western thoughts, although idea of
"intellectual intuition" is not dominant, there isn't a lack of it. For example,
we can find it in Fichte and Schelling. Nastida's understanding of "intellectual
intuition" is based mainly on Schilling's interpretations.
Ⅳ
It seems that we can sum up the discussions made up to now: the western
philosophy, having developed until, Kant, becomes visible on two basic lines: on is the
line of metaphysical doctrines, and the other is that of the positive theories. Through
the advancing of the negative concept of "intellectual intuition", Kant
differentiates the two lines entirely. It is due to this that the oriental thinkers of
modern time can see where the ultimate problems lie with the help of this concept of
Kant's. And the charm of Kant's philosophy consists in the fact that it clearly points out
where the problems lie.
On one had, the insisting of metaphysical doctrines results in
mysticism at last, which was a home for nearly all metaphysicians to return to. On the
other hand, the carrying out of positive theories results in the collapse of any
metaphysical teachings on moral. That is a difficult position, with which the humanity is
confronted at present. Kant does his utmost to avoid this dilemma. Nashida is aware of
this point after Kant, and Mu Zong-san also sees clearly the root of this problem. They
make their choice in their own ways as to the problem, either with a preference for
metaphysical doctrines, or with a preference for positive theories, but neither of them
managed to clear up this
dilemma.
A comparatively more effective attempt on the problem
"intellectual intuition" is newly offered by phenomenologists. When they take
over this problem, they have already seen their assignment to be faced with: If the
positive concept of "intellectual intuition" is tenable, if the third way
between metaphysical doctrines and positive theories is possible, it must satisfy the
threefold claims: 1. It must possess the function of lawgivers, i.e. the function to give
the original fundament for itself. 2. It must surpass the manacle of the thinking mode of
subject ad object, i.e., abandon the empirical-positive position. 3. It must also be a
distinct insight, i.e., free itself from the hue of mysticism.
Husserl, the originator of phenomenology, touches this problem firstly
in "Logical investigations". He still would like to work under the title of
"intuition", but he expands it from the simple to the general. Concretely
speaking, Husserl distinguishes "the super-sensual intuition" from "the
sensual intuition". The former is also called "the essential" or "the
caregorical intuition". The phenomenological method of consciousness-analysis makes
Husserl possible to differentiate the two essential moment
"signification-intention" (Bedeutungsintention) and "signification
-fulfilling" (Bedeutungserfuellung) in all intuitive acts. He calls them figuratively
"aiming at" and "shooting" too. When our consciousness receives some
sensual data, it always has an intention to synthesise and integrate them, and recognise
them as an object, a table for example. And this intention shall be further fulfilled in
the more and more abundant sensual data. The constitution of sensual objects follows this
way all the time.
Now, what is the case with the "intellectual intuition"?
Husserl distinguishes here further the moment of "sensual datum" (material
intention) from the moment of "categorical form" (formal intention) in the
"signification- intention". He says, "the prue sensuality can never provide
the categorical intention with a filling-out, more exactly speaking, it can never provide
the intetion containing categorical forms with a filling-out." This fact, which he
points out, can explain why the categorical intuition is such an action without objects:
that is because, while categorical intentions like "being", "and",
"or" etc. are going on, they can never fulfil themselves in sensual data. That
is to say, the categorical of formal intuition is still such an intuition, which is
founded in the "sensual intuition", bur cannot be filled out in the sensual
data.
Accordingly we can define "intellectual intuition" this way:
it is such an intuition, whose categorical intention must have sensual data as its basis,
but cannot be fulfilled in sensual data. In other words, in the "intellectual
intuition", something formal is immediately intended, but it cannot be filled out in
sensual data. In fact, we are not able to imagine a categorical form, which exists without
any sensual data, even if this categorical form is so abstract as "being",
"time" or "space". After that, Husserl expands the "intellectual
intuition" to the essential intuition (seeing of an essence) in general. Essences and
ideas, such as "one", "red", "table" and so on, all deal
with the ideal intentions, which start from sensual data, but they cannot be fulfilled in
them. Therefore, Husserl in justified to maintain: "The old epistemologycal
antithesis of sensuality and understanding acquired its final clarification awaited by us
through the distinction between the simple intuition or the sensual intuition and the
founded intuition or the categorical intuition.
This result of intentional analysis has also its influence on another
phenomenologist Heidegger afterward. He finds the special characters of the
"categorical intuition" pointed out by Husserl and connects it with the
intuition of time and that of being. According to the analysis of the philosophers after
Kant, Heidegger has already had the insight into the fact: Although Kant differentiates
between sensuality and understanding, and disaffirms the "intellectual
intuition", yet his affirmation of the forms of intuition themselves, time and space,
are neither sensual nor intellectual, because time and space cannot be sensually intuited,
but they do not belong to categories of understanding either. Therefore, there must exist
something that can be called as "intellectual intuition". It is due to this that
Heidegger lays excessive stress on the concept of "imagination" in his
"Kant and the problem of Metaphysics", and sees it as "building
force". It is both a "receptive" ability and a "creative" one.
Meanwhile, from Husserl's interpretation of "intellectual intuition" in
"logical investigations", Heidegger wins a starting-point of the problem of
being, which he follows with interest in life: "The distinguishing between the
sensual and the intellectual intuition worked out here unveils itself for me in its range
for the definition of the 'manifold signification' of entity", "so, illuminated
by the phenomenological attitude, I was introduced onto the road of the problem of
being".
Heidegger's reception of Husser's thought of "categorical
intuition" is embodied concretely in the fact that on one hand "what is
represented in the ideas cannot be freely imagined, it must be known itself in a
knowledge". Essentially speaking, this knowledge is an "intuition", an
"immediate representation of what is meant in its self-presence of being", and
it turns itself to God, the world and the essence of human being (freedom), i.e., to the
totality of the existential entity. On the other hand, this knowledge, taking the fact of
freedom for example, is not positive knowledge. It cannot be exhibited like the
gastrelcoma-nidus on the X-ray -plate. As for this fact, we can neither see nor hear it,
neither touch nor smell of taste it. Therefore, this knowledge is a "non-objective
knowledge", What it wants to know is "nothing else but the struchure of the
entity, which now does not stand as a object opposite to the knowledge, but forms itself
in the knowledge, this self-forming is the absolute being". What Heidegger
articulates here reminds us quite easly of Mu Zong-san's ideas in "intellectual
intuition". It is in the same sense that Heidegger says, "An idea is only guide
to discovering, but not the discovered itself." This similar analysis and description
consist in Heidegger's grasp of the relationship between being and entity: Being cannot be
separated from entity, it is "always being of entity", but being itself is
neither entity nor the whole o entity.
We might as well make mention of Scheler, another important philosopher
of phenomenology, whose definition of the "personality" follows the same
orientation: Personality can never be an "object" and it can never be given us
as an object, but it is the highest problem, which is discussed by ethics. Scheler makes a
new definition for the word "intuition", which is even more clarified than that
of Husserl: It means "not necessarily the image of contents", but "the
immediateness in the given of objects". "Intuition" in this sense is the
same as an immediate awakening of the life itself in the life. Scheler also calls it
"Er-leben des leben". It stands opposite to the perception as "gelebtes
leben". The correlate of the former is primary, and that of the latter is secondary,
and so on. Scheler's distinguishing between "emotional Er-leben" and
"perceptive Er-leben" reminds us of Mu Zong-san's differentiation between
"vertical intuition" and "horizontal intuition" too. We can say that
"intellectual intuition" in Scheler appears in the form of "intuition of
the life". Precisely as Heidegger in his later period admits that he himself is
enlightened by Husserl's analysis of "categorical intuition" in the respect of
the problem of being, he also points out in the early "Being and Time" that what
Scheler accentuates I the problem of "non-objective personality" is exactly what
Husserl has proposed.
We cannot make a further detailed discussion on this and we just have
to leave one point confirmed here above all: The problem of "intellectual
intuition" has acquired a further clarification in phenomenology, and it has also
become a fundamental moment through the vein of phenomenology.
According to the analysis above, phenomenology has really made a mighty
advance in the respect of "seeing" and "description". As for the
dilemma in regard to "intellectual intuition", it provides a more convincing
programme, which neither abandons the intuitive insights, nor does it mystify the
metaphysical theories. Thereupon, the phenomenology can show a possible middle course
between the metaphysical doctrines and the positive theories. Meanwhile, the
constitutional analysis of Husserl's phenomenology endows the correlates of the
"intellectual intuition" with the same right as those of the "sensual
intuition": They are all what is originally constituted. In other words, even if the
fact of freedom, for example, cannot be fulfilled in the sensual data, it still possesses
the status of knowledge, even that of the primary knowledge. As far as this is concerned,
the explanation of phenomenology can satisfy the threefold claims above in a certain
degree.
Of course, the "intellectual intuition" is thus still not an
open sesame, which can resolve all philosophical difficult problems. Such an open sesame
does not exist at all. But the phenomenological analysis shows that "intellectual
intuition" has already become a possible bridge for the communication between the
metaphysical doctrines and the positive theories. Therefore, Levinas is justified to say,
"Due to its renunciation of the descriptive method, the constitution of types and the
persistence of the concepts, the traditional speculation has jumped over quite a few
research fields. The incontestable contribution of phenomenology lies at the requirement
to carry on systematic and endurant descriptions, which certainly are preliminaryin the
process of 'Returning to the thing itself'. So phenomenology is available for both
positivists and metaphysicians."